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A BRIEF COMMENT ON POLITICALLY
INCORRECT SPEECH IN THE WAKE
OF R.A.V.
Ronald D. Rotunda *
I. INTRODUCTION
S HAWN Brown is a sophomore at the University of Michigan. For his
assignment in Political Science 11l he wrote a term paper on possible
inherent flaws in political polling data. It contained the following
passage:
Another problem with sampling polls is that some people desire their
privacy and don't want to be bothered by a pollster. Let's say Dave
Stud is entertaining three beautiful ladies in his penthouse when the
phone rings. A pollster on the other end wants to know if we should
eliminate the capital gains tax. Now Dave is a knowledgeable business-
person who cares a lot about this issue. But since Dave is "tied up" at
the moment, he tells the pollster to "bother" someone else. Now this is
perhaps a ludicrous example, but there is simply a segment of the popu-
lation who wish to be left alone. They have more important things to be
concerned about-jobs, family, school, etc. If this segment of the popu-
lation is never actually polled, then the results of the poll could be
skewed.'
Mr. Brown's teacher, Ms. Debbie Meizlish, may have been pleased to see
the sex-neutral term, "businessperson," but was otherwise appalled. She in-
terpreted Mr. Brown's term paper as sexual harassment directed against her.
She wrote the following to Mr. Brown:
You are right. This is ludicrous & inappropriate & OFFENSIVE. This
is completely inappropriate for a serious political science paper. It com-
pletely violates the standard of non-sexist writing. Professor Rosen-
stone has encouraged me to interpret this comment as an example of
sexual harassment and to take the appropriate formal steps. I have cho-
sen not to do so in this instance. However, any future comments in a
paper, in a class or in any dealings w/ me will be interpreted as sexual
harassment and formal steps will be taken. Professor Rosenstone is
aware of these comments--& is prepared to intervene. You are
forewarned!2
* Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am
indebted to Professor Jules B. Gerard for his helpful comments.
1. Language Censors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1993, at A14. The Michigan Review, the
student-run newspaper, originally reported this incident.
2. Id.
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Mr. Brown did not need another warning. He dropped the course.
The University of Michigan is a state institution, and Professors Meizlish
and Rosenstone are state actors, governed by the First Amendment, as ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Aside from such
constitutional niceties, a university is supposed not only to tolerate but en-
courage free speech. The Supreme Court recognized the obvious when it
emphasized that there are special protections for speech within a university
setting because "the university is a traditional sphere of free expression [that
is] fundamental to the functioning of our society . . . ."4 But Mr. Brown's
speech was not "pc."
Until a few years ago, I would have thought that "pc" stood for "personal
computer." Now it stands for "politically correct," a relatively new term
added to our lexicon. In the old days, we would have labeled as "thought
control" any effort to control what we say or think. Now it is an effort to
ban certain language considered improper, inappropriate, or offensive to
people who are politically correct. To be politically incorrect is a sin.
Thus, the Governor of Washington recently ordered that he will no longer
call his "Chief of Staff" the "Chief of Staff" because some members of the
Swinomish tribe objected to the term "chief" as insensitive. 5 Hence, the
new title of "Staff Director."' 6 Although "chief" is derived from Latin and
not from any Native American word, 7 some people have decided that its use
is no longer politically correct. There is no report of what might be in store
for those in the Governor's office who use the wrong term in referring to the
Staff Director.
Consider what was in store for Professor Judith Kleinfeld, a Professor of
Education at the University of Alaska, in Fairbanks, when she made a politi-
cally incorrect statement. Her troubles began after she spoke before the edu-
cation subcommittee of the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce. In response
to a question, she complained that the University was not doing its job of
educating Alaskan Native Americans; to cover up its failure, it then pres-
sured teachers to graduate Native Americans unprepared to assume careers
as educators. The employers, in turn, were reluctant to hire these graduates.
When the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the U.S. Department of Education
learned of her remark, it began a thorough investigation. The OCR's four-
month probe sought to determine if her language constituted illegal
discrimination. 8
Because the Office of Education charged Professor Kleinfeld with what
3. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.1-.4 (4th ed. 1991).
4. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991).
5. Mike Lowry, The Coming PC Crackup, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1993, at A14.
6. Id.
7. "Chief" or "chieftain" is derived from "achieve," which is a contraction of the
French phrase, "venir i chief," meaning, to come to a head. JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, DICTION-
ARY OF WORD ORIGINS 7, 79 (1955). This French expression, in turn, comes from the Latin
expression, "ad caput venire," to come to a peak or to an end. Id. at 7. The term "captain,"
like "chieftain," shares the same word origin from the Latin noun, "caput," or head. Id.
8. Michael S. Greve & Joseph A. Shea, When the Feds Weigh In on P. C., LEGAL TIMES,
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she said, not with what she did (there were no allegations of any discrimina-
tory acts), it asked her to submit her writings and research so that the Office
of Education could officially examine them. The Office of Education also
asked Professor Kleinfeld's colleagues to supply examples of allegedly racist
"speech or thought" in her past. For four months the Government engaged
in a thorough investigation of what Professor Kleinfeld said, what she wrote,
what she thought.9
Though it finally dropped the investigation, we should not underestimate
the chilling effects of this assault on her mind. She and her colleagues now
know that any spurious complaints by disgruntled colleagues or students
may set in motion a lengthy investigation of what they say, read, or think,
what kind of books they borrow from the library, what videos they rent,
which magazines they subscribe to, what they say to their friends, and how
they react when others say something to them. All this information is fair
game and relevant for this type of investigation.
These examples are not unique. Nat Hentoff, in his beautifully written
book, Free Speech for Me-But Not for Thee: How the American Left and
Right Relentlessly Censor Each Other,10 chronicles many others. The danger
to free speech and free thought is real.
Make no mistake. I am not defending those who practice race or sex dis-
crimination. Such people are morally wrong and live in an antediluvian
world."I Nor do I think that words or labels lack power. On the contrary,
words both reflect and mold the way we think. 12 Words are important, and
some words cause offense. Indeed, that is often the reason why people use
them. For those who believe that words lack power, let them read Marc
Antony's Funeral Oration and the actions that flowed from that speech. 13
Jan. 25, 1993, at 38. The complaint received by the Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights read, in its entirety, as follows:
On September 5, 1991, Dr. Judith Kleinfeld alleged before an education sub-
committee of the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce that Native students of the
University of Alaska were simply being "passed along," apparently without re-
gard to academic achievement. Many people have disagreed but she is a reputed
expert on Native education and many people have supported her even though
she has never provided any evidence in support of her allegation.
Id.
The assertion in the last clause-that "she has never provided any evidence in support of her
allegation"-apparently assumes that her eye-witness testimony is not evidence. It would be
analogous to the police telling the victim of an attempted murder, "You have no evidence to
support your charge-other than your eye-witness identification."
9. Id. at 39.
10. NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE: HOW THE AMERI-
CAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992); see also Edward J.
Cleary, Symposium: Hate Speech After R.A. V.: More Conflict Between Free Speech and Equal-
ity?, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 889 (1992); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a
Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 1993); Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist
Speech": The View from Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 631 (1992).
11. It is a small sign of progress that even bigots who practice discrimination seldom do so
openly, because hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue.
12. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE: LIBERALISM AS WORD
AND SYMBOL (1986).
13. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
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Words also can wound. A "verbal assault" is not an oxymoron.
It is because words have such enormous force that we have the First
Amendment. If words did not have potency, we would be less concerned
when the government seeks to restrict speech. A "function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute."' 14 The First Amend-
ment offers protection to words because of, not in spite of, the fact that
"words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force."' 15 It is because words have such influence that the Court constantly
reminds us that the remedy for the speech with which we disagree is more
speech, not less. 16 The new Jacobins deny this.
II. CONTENT BASED RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
In a long line of cases the Court has made clear that content-based restric-
tions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional. 17 When the Court has
allowed content-based or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech, it has done
so only under very limited circumstances. We know that the government
can make it illegal to incite a lynch mob to riot. When the speaker objec-
tively and subjectively intends to produce imminent disorder and the cir-
cumstances are such that imminent disorder is likely to result, the law can
intervene.' 8 When the speech intends to incite a riot (like yelling "fire" in a
crowded theater) there is no opportunity for others to seek to persuade the
crowd to accept a contrary position; there is no opportunity to rely on the
marketplace of ideas for reasoned debate, because the intent of the speaker
and the circumstances in which he or she harangues the crowd amount to
incitement, and time is of the essence.
This governmental power to restrict speech that incites riots or other seri-
ous unlawful conduct is a very narrow one. It is no coincidence that, in
modem times, when the Court has applied this test to particular cases, it has
always found that the government has not met its burden and that the
speech was constitutionally protected, even though it was offensive and even
racist. 19 Thus, in Brandenburg v. Ohio20 the Court reversed the conviction
14. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
16. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Best Response to Speech We Don't Like Is More Speech, CHI.
SUN TIMES, May 16, 1992, at 14.
17. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990). See generally Peter Maggs & Ronald D. Rotunda, Meanwhile, Back in
Mother Russia, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 35 (Soviet congress repealed legislation making
it a crime to "discredit" a public official).
18. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam). See generally 4 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.15 (2d ed. 1992).
19. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (antiwar demonstration; conviction over-
turned); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (racist speech of Ku Klux
Klan leader; conviction overturned); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam)
(threatening the life of the President; conviction overturned); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116
(1966) (opposing draft laws; conviction overturned); see also 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 18, § 20.15.




of a Ku Klux Klan leader who advocated violence. The violence, said the
Court, did not involve imminent action. 21 The key is "incitement." Simi-
larly, in Hess v. Indiana 22 the Court overturned a disorderly conduct convic-
tion of Hess, who, during an antiwar demonstration, shouted that the crowd
should take the streets "later" or "again." As a matter of law, said the
Court, the state had not proved that Hess' words amounted to advocacy of
incitement, of "imminent lawless action."' 23 The Court held that Hess's
shouting "could be taken as counsel for present moderation; at worst, it
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite
future time."'24
Speech that promotes hate is a terrible thing, and thus various people,
particularly in recent times, have tried to prohibit or punish such speech. 25
Hate speech, however, usually does not meet the strict test of speech to incite
imminent lawless action. The speaker, by hurling degrading racial or sexual
epithets, intends to insult or verbally wound his listeners, not to persuade
them to commit violence. Such language does not fit within the narrow con-
tours of the Brandenburg/Hess line of cases. Thus, opponents of hate speech
have tried to ban it using a different theory, claiming that racial slurs, insen-
sitive language, and sexist speech all amount to speech that constitutes
"fighting words;" that is, speech calculated to create an automatic, unthink-
ing, violent reaction in the listener, rather than the consideration of an
idea.26
The Supreme Court created what it called the "fighting words doctrine"
over a half century ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.27 Fighting words
are those uttered with the intention to "incite an immediate breach of the
peace" 28 when directed to a particular individual.29 Words become fighting
words when they are an offer to exchange fisticuffs on an individualized,
face-to-face level rather than a mob level. The speaker does not incite a
crowd, as in the Brandenburg/Hess situation, but seeks to provoke a particu-
lar individual. The fighting words principle is really a specific, retail applica-
tion of the incitement cases. Fighting words are "directed against
individuals to provoke violence or to inflict injury."'30
Offensive, scatological, racist, or sexist statements, even if accompanied by
a call to fight, are not within the fighting words doctrine if the object of the
speaker's hate is not a particular individual whom the speaker challenges on
a face-to-face basis. Thus, in Terminiello v. Chicago 31 the Court invalidated
21. Id. at 447.
22. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
23. Id. at 108 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
24. Id.
25. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
26. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
27. Id
28. Id. at 572.
29. Id. at 573-74.
30. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2553 (1992) (White, J., joined by Black-
mun, J. & O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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a breach of the peace conviction for Terminiello, who was denouncing Jews,
as well as other groups, including members of the turbulent and angry crowd
before whom he was speaking. 32 Collin v. Smith 33 offers a more recent ex-
ample. There, the Seventh Circuit held that members of the American Nazi
Party had a right to march in front of the Village Hall in Skokie, a Chicago
suburb with a large Jewish population, including several thousand survivors
of the Nazi holocaust. Even though such speech was offensive, the court
overturned the Village's ordinance that banned the dissemination of any
materials promoting and inciting racial hatred.34
If the fighting words doctrine does not prevent Nazis from marching in
Skokie, it should be clear that the Court never intended it to be used as a
justification to root out politically incorrect speech. The prohibition against
fighting words is not a restriction on the thought or idea itself but on the
manner or mode of expressing it, in connection with a face-to-face call to
fisticuffs. One can be a hatemonger without falling within the narrow fight-
ing words doctrine. The fighting words rule only allows the state to prohibit
an intolerable technique or manner of expressing an idea (a personal call to
fisticuffs), but does not authorize the state to ban the idea itself.35
In the same manner, one can be a bigot-that is, believe in bigotry, intol-
erance, and prejudice-without practicing discrimination. And one can
practice discrimination without believing in bigotry. For example, Em-
ployer # I may be personally opposed to all forms of sex discrimination, but
pays the most recently hired female employee less than the most recently
hired male employee. Employer # 1 may be personally very upset at the
pay differential, but still engages in the discrimination because the alterna-
tive is bankruptcy for his small business. Employer # 1 does not believe in
bigotry, but he is practicing sexual discrimination, an illegal act that the
state may ban. 36 Employer # 2, in contrast, may be a bigot and a chauvin-
ist, but he treats all employees alike, without regard to their sex, because he
fears civil or criminal penalties. Under the First Amendment, the law can-
not punish Employer # 2 because he has committed no discriminatory act,
even though he is a bigot. 37
32. Id. at 5-6.
33. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
34. Id. at 1207. "[A]busive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace," is not
within the fighting words doctrine if the jury may determine guilt as "measured by common
understanding and practice." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 528 (1972). In Gooding
the Court invalidated a breach of the peace conviction. Id. at 528. The defendant said to a
policeman who was attempting to restore access to a public building, "White son of a bitch, I'll
kill you." Id. at 534. To another, the defendant said: "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your
hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id.
35. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
36. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your
Sentence?-Constitutional Law and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 333, 367-68 (1991).
37. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). In Mitchell Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, for a unanimous Court, upheld the constitutionality of a Wisconsin state law that au-
thorized the defendant's sentence for aggravated battery to be enhanced when he intentionally
selects his victim on the basis of race, religion, or other protected status. Id. at 2202. The
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Challenging someone to a fight can fall within the fighting words doctrine,
but simply to engage in speech expressing hate, racial or otherwise, does not
fall into this category-even if the listeners (who could simply walk away)
are motivated to fight the hatemonger. The Court has emphasized that it
does not favor prosecutions for fighting words, which it treats as a narrow
exception. As in the incitement line of cases, the Supreme Court, while not
overruling Chaplinsky, has refused to uphold such convictions in recent
years.3
8
The government may not use the fighting words doctrine to punish a
speaker because others, who do not like the message conveyed, are moti-
vated to engage in violence against the speaker. The fighting words doctrine
does not allow the state to punish people simply because they express unpop-
ular or even erroneous views. Words or symbols do not become fighting
words merely because the speaker deeply offends the listeners. As Zechariah
Chafee, the great First Amendment advocate, warned over a half century
ago:
The reductio ad absurdum of this theory was the imprisonment of Jo-
seph Palmer, one of Bronson Alcott's fellow-settlers at "Fruitlands,"
not because he was a communist, but because he persisted in wearing
such a long beard that people kept mobbing him, until law and order
were maintained by shutting him up. A man does not become a crimi-
nal because someone else assaults him, unless his own conduct is in
itself illegal or may be reasonably considered a direct provocation to
violence.39
As the examples that began this article illustrate, the politically correct
zealot does not appreciate the wisdom of a Zechariah Chafee and rejects this
interpretation of the fighting words doctrine. That is why the recent opinion
of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul4 is so significant. It makes clear that the
Court-albeit in a split decision-rejects political correctness as a gloss lim-
iting the First Amendment.
Wisconsin law, the Court explained, is not explicitly directed at speech but is aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. at 2201; see also infra note 72.
38. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, § 20.40.
39. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 151-52 (1942) (cita-
tions omitted); accord Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). In Cohen Justice Harlan,
for the Court, ruled that even though some people might respond to a speech by physically
assaulting the speaker,
that is an insufficient base upon which to erect, consistently with constitutional
values, a governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissi-
dent views into avoiding particular forms of expression. The argument amounts
to little more than the self-defeating proposition that to avoid physical censor-
ship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypothetical
coterie of the violent and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate
that censorship themselves.
Id. at 23.
40. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., and Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, in which Blackmun and O'Connor, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined
except as to Part I-A. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J.,




III. DECIPHERING R.A. V
r .
In R.A. V., the City of St. Paul enacted an ordinance that provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appella-
tion, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.41
The City alleged that R.A.V. and several other teenagers burned a cross
inside the privately owned, fenced yard of a black family, who lived across
the street from where R.A.V. was staying. R.A.V., of course, intended to
terrorize the black family, but the State did not charge him with trespass or
a similar offense.42 The only question before the Court was the constitution-
ality of this hate ordinance, not other charges that the City could have
brought against R.A.V.
The state supreme court had ruled that the ordinance only reached ex-
pressions that were fighting words, within the meaning of Chaplinsky, and
that it was a "narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated
threats to public safety and order .... -'43 Thus, in the view of the state
court, the ordinance was constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed."
Justice Scalia, for the majority, accepted the state court's interpretation of
its law, but concluded that the ordinance was still unconstitutional on its
face.4 5 Its fatal flaw was that it "prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely
on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."' 46 The significance of
R.A. V is that the Court applied the general rule against content-based regu-
lation of speech to the fighting words doctrine: the government may not reg-
ulate even fighting words if the restriction is "based on hostility--or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." '47
R.A. V can be a confusing case. It is best understood by turning to a hy-
41. Id. at 2541.
42. The state also had charged RAN. with violation of a state law that prohibited ra-
cially motivated assault, but there was no constitutional challenge to that count. R.A.V. also
engaged in trespass, a charge that raises no First Amendment issues. See id. at 2541 n.2 (citing
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1990)); see also id. at 2541 n.l (citing to other
applicable laws under which R.A.V. could have been charged, such as terroristic threats, ar-
son, and criminal damage to property).
43. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 505, 511 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nonm, R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
44. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2542 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 2545. Thus, for example, a content-neutral ban on targeted residential picketing
is constitutionally valid, on its face. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988). But a ban
that exempts labor picketing is not content-neutral, because it exempts picketing that refers to




pothetical that Justice Scalia used to explain the Court's ruling. The prob-
lem with the St. Paul ordinance is that, under its provisions,
[o]ne could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic
bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would
insult and provoke violence "on the basis of religion." St. Paul has no
such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules. 48
Justice Stevens, in his separate concurring opinion, sought to distinguish
this hypothetical example. However, in order to distinguish the hypothetical
fact situation, he first had to change it! He recited exactly the above quota-
tion, and then stated the following, including the bracketed language: "This
may be true, but it hardly proves the Court's point. The Court's reasoning is
asymmetrical. The response is a sign saying that 'all [religious] bigots are
misbegotten' is a sign saying that 'all advocates of religious tolerance are
misbegotten.' ,,49
The problem with Stevens's reasoning50 is that the hypothetical ordi-
nance, in fact, does make it a crime for someone to state that "all papists are
misbegotten," but does not make it a crime to state that "all anti-Catholic
bigots are misbegotten." The ordinance, by its own terms, only seeks to ban
certain types of fighting words: it seeks to ban words that would insult and
provoke on the basis of religion, but not similar words that do not fit within
that category, even though they are fighting words. In order for Stevens to
reject this crucial hypothetical, he first had to alter it. He then criticized this
strawman of his own creation, a hypothetical that Scalia had not advanced.
That this ordinance is content-based was not in dispute. The Minnesota
Supreme Court, in upholding the ordinance, emphasized that the ordinance
was directed against "bias-motivated" hatred, and messages "based on viru-
lent notions of racial supremacy." 5' The brief of St. Paul, filed in the juve-
nile court, explicitly stated that the "burning of a cross does express a
message ... which the St. Paul Ordinance attempts to legislate."'52
The fighting words doctrine only allows the state to prohibit, in certain
narrowly defined circumstances, an intolerable technique or manner of ex-
pressing an idea. It never authorizes the state to ban the idea itself. As the
Court explained, "the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded
from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content com-
municates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly
intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the
48. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
49. Id. at 2571. Stevens also stated that it "seems to me" to be "extremely unlikely" that
such signs "could be fighting words." Id. However, if Justice Scalia had substituted a more
vernacular, vulgar, or colloquial term than the polysyllabic word, "misbegotten"-often fight-
ing words are monosyllabic and the people who speak them do not speak the King's English-
it should not be difficult to conceive of the expression being placed in the category of fighting
words.
50. Note that White and Blackmun only joined part I of Stevens's separate opinion, not
this part.
51. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 508, 511.
52. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548 (quoting Brief for Respondent).
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speaker wishes to convey."' 53 Yet Minnesota sought to restrict only particu-
lar ideas and not others, even though all fell within the fighting words
category.
The fighting words doctrine is analogous to the principle that allows the
state to ban a noisy sound truck. The state can ban a noisy truck because it
interferes with peace and quiet; it is an improper means of expressing an
idea.54 Though the state can ban the noise, it cannot ban the message. For
example, the state has no power to ban noisy sound trucks expressing Re-
publican ideas. The state can prohibit the sound truck only because it is
noisy, not because of the ideas that it is promoting.
Similarly, the state can ban setting fires in the public streets, but it cannot
prohibit someone from burning the flag as a means of protest.55 If a person
decided to burn the flag on a public street, the state could punish the act of
burning (no matter what it was that the defendant was burning), because it
would be justified by a neutral statute that prohibited only an act without
regard to what a person was seeking to express. A law that made it a crime
to disgrace the flag by burning it, however, would be improper, because it
requires the state to prove a certain mental attitude in connection with the
burning.56
In short, when the Court holds that fighting words are a category of
speech excluded from the protection of the First Amendment, it really
means that the state may ban a call to exchange fisticuffs, no matter what
idea the speaker wishes to express. This doctrine does not give the state
power to ban speech solely on the basis of the subjects that the speaker ad-
dresses. R.A. V does not impose an underinclusiveness requirement on the
fighting words doctrine. Rather, it imposes the familiar requirement that the
state prohibition on proscribable speech not be based on the content of
speech. Selective regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional.57
The state can prohibit some speech because of its content, so we must look
at the content of speech to see if it falls within a category where the state has
special powers to ban speech. For example, should the speech at issue be
treated as fighting words or obscenity? That does not mean, however, that
the state has carte blanche to do as it wishes and engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination merely because speech falls in the category of fighting words or
obscenity.
53. Id. at 2548-49.
54. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) with Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989). See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 280-82 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
55. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
56. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, §§ 20.48-.49 (discussing symbolic speech).
57. The presumption of invalidity may, in unusual circumstances, be overcome. Thus,
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), with no majority opinion, upheld a Tennessee law,
typical of the law of many jurisdictions, that prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display
or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling place. There was substantial
history that supported the conclusion that the state had a compelling interest in preventing
voter intimidation and election fraud. Id. at 1851-52. History supported the conclusion that
the best way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot and safeguard the integrity of the election
process is to limit access to the area around the voter. Id. at 1852-55.
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Thus, the state could ban all obscene speech because it is all proscribable
or able to be forbidden, in spite of the First Amendment. ' In addition, the
state could ban all obscene speech in a certain media or market, such as all
obscene speech on the telephone, because obscene speech in that particular
market is thought to be more troubling. 58 The latter prohibition is not based
on any viewpoint expressed by the speech, so it is not prohibited by any
principle found in R.A. V There is no danger that the state is really inter-
ested in suppressing particular ideas. It is only suppressing prurience in a
particular market. Yet it would be improper for the state to ban only ob-
scenity that includes an offensive political message.59 The power of the gov-
ernment to ban obscenity or fighting words does not give it the power to
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace of ideas.
Under the principle of R.A. V., the state can forbid fraud in one type of
industry but not another, simply because the state believes that the risk of
fraud is greater in one industry than another. There is no danger that the
state is really seeking to ban the content of certain types of speech or sup-
press certain viewpoints in such circumstances. However, R.A. V teaches
that the state "may not prohibit only that commercial advertising that de-
picts men in a demeaning fashion." 6 That would fail the requirement that
there must be "no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot."' 6' Advertising that depicts men or women in a demeaning fashion is
not to be admired, but it is protected by the First Amendment nonetheless.
The Government cannot seek to drive out or disfavor this particular view-
point, even though it is offensive.
Consistent with R.A. V., the Federal Government has a narrow power to
ban speech that threatens the President. 62 The reason why the First Amend-
ment, in some circumstances, does not protect threats of violence is that
such threats engender fear, disrupt activities, and cause apprehension; all
these reasons apply with special force when the Federal Government prohib-
its threats that specify the President. Yet even here, "the Federal Govern-
ment may not criminalize only those threats against the President that
mention his policy on aid to inner cities. '' 63 Law forbidding threats against
the President does not discriminate based on the viewpoint of the speaker.
58. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S.
115 (1989).
59. Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1041
(1991). Stevens, in his separate opinion, argued that obscene anti-government speech was
"fantastical," because, by definition, it does not lack serious political value. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct.
at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring). Scalia briefly responded by noting that a hard core obscene
movie, with a model sporting a political tattoo, is still obscene. Id. at 2544 n.4. The State can
decide to ban all constitutionally obscene movies, but it cannot ban only those obscene movies
where the actors are clad with only Democratic, but not Republican, tattoos.
60." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
61. Id. at 2547.
62. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), upheld the facial validity of 18 U.S.C.
§ 871 (1988), which makes threats on the life of the President a criminal offense. On its facts,
however, the Court overturned the conviction. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705. The defendant was a
man who told a small crowd that if he were drafted into the Army and forced to carry a rifle,
"the first man I want to get in my sights is [President] L.B.J." Id. at 706.
63. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
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On the other hand, to forbid threats only if accompanied by racist remarks
does discriminate based on the viewpoint of the speaker.
R.A. V does not preclude the state from banning discriminatory conduct.
One cannot immunize oneself from a ban on conduct merely by accompany-
ing that conduct by speech. For example, pursuant to Title VII, Congress
has banned sexually discriminatory conduct in employment practices."
Such conduct (e.g. a failure to promote a worker because of her sex) is not
immune from prohibition merely because the practitioner accompanies the
bad conduct with sexually disparaging statements. Similarly, a murder has
no First Amendment claim simply because a murderer yells, "Sic semper
tyrannis" as he pulls the trigger. Sexually derogatory fighting words,
"among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibi-
tion against sexual discrimination in employment practices," because where
"the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive con-
tent, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea or philosophy."'65
Thus, Justice Scalia explained that the First Amendment forbids the state
from prohibiting "only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a
demeaning fashion."'66 Justice White objected to this principle, complaining
that "[u]nder the general rule the Court applies in this case, Title VII hostile
work environment claims would suddenly be unconstitutional" 67 because
the law does not prohibit workplace harassment generally, but instead fo-
cuses on the "disfavored topic" of sexual harassment. 68 R.A. V. teaches that
the state may not forbid sexually derogatory language unless, first, the words
fit within the narrow category of fighting words and, second, the state does
not single out only those words for special restrictions. Just as the City of St.
Paul may not single out racist fighting words for special restrictions, it may
not single out sexist fighting words for special restrictions. The power to
criminalize conduct is quite a bit different than the power to criminalize
mere speech, even offensive speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
R.A. V is an important case because it forbids the state from making mere
words a crime when the words are politically incorrect. The fighting words
doctrine, like the Brandenburg/Hess line of cases, does not authorize the
state to drive certain ideas from the marketplace, even when the ideas are
abhorrent. Even when prohibiting fighting words, the state may not engage
in an effort to suppress unpopular or even offensive ideas. 69 The state may
64. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000e-2 (1988).
65. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546-47 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 2546.
67. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2546. Title VII regulations forbid sexual harassment, which includes
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature .... " 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
69. Blackmun concurred in the judgment but not the opinion in R.A. V. In Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), Blackmun had complained in his dissent in that "the Court,
[Vol. 47
POLITICALLY INCORRECT SPEECH
forbid fighting words, as long as it does so in a viewpoint neutral manner.
There must be, in short, no realistic possibility that the state is trying to
officially suppress ideas. 70
Moreover, the state cannot simply outlaw the use of a particular word. 71
It can prohibit the use of certain fighting words in particular contexts such
as face-to-face personal insults, but even then the state cannot impose a con-
tent based restriction - it cannot ban only fighting words that reflect on a
certain group. For example, the law could not forbid a white man from
hurling racists anti-black fighting words at a black man, but permit a black
man to hurl racist and anti-white words at a white man. The fatal flaw of
the St. Paul law in R.A. V was that it was content based. The reason Justice
Scalia's hypothetical regarding Papists is so critical is because it illustrates
that crucial basic point.
If bad motive or the belief in bigotry may be made a crime, then the state
can question defendants and subpoena records as to what newspapers or
magazines they read, what books are in their library, or what they have
confided to their friends. All of this information is relevant because it may
show the propensity to commit the crime of bad motive, the offense of being
politically incorrect. In addition, if the magazine article or book that advo-
cates the politically incorrect viewpoint is persuasive, then it may be a crime
for the author to have written it.7 2
R.A. V. teaches us that the government may not regulate fighting words
despite its protestations to the contrary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky." Id. at
537. The decision in R.A. V indicates that the Court will not allow content-based restrictions
on speech, even if the restrictions are otherwise justified by the fighting words doctrine.
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
70. Thus, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), discussed supra note 37, the
Court noted that a statute enhancing the penalty for defendants convicted of battery when the
defendants intentionally select their victims on account of their race, religion, or other pro-
tected status, has no chilling effect on speech:
We must conjure up a vision of a Wisconsin citizen suppressing his unpopular
bigoted opinions for fear that if he later commits an offense covered by the stat-
ute, these opinions will be offered at trial to establish that he selected his victim
on account of the victim's protected status, thus qualifying him for penalty-
enhancement.... This is simply too speculative a hypothesis ....
Id. at 2201.
71. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
72. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining why the substantive criminal law only considers the defendant's purpose or
intent (e.g., breaking and entering with the intent to steal), but not the defendant's motive).
For example, the defendant may break and enter with the intent to steal, accompanied by the
motive of stealing in order to contribute to a worthy charity, or to pay off defendant's just
debts, or to buy illegal drugs. The motive may explain why the defendant engaged in breaking
and entering with the intent to steal, but it does not affect, excuse, mitigate, decrease, increase,
or escalate the nature of the crime. As Professors LaFave and Scott note, "motive ... is not
relevant on the substantive side of the criminal law." Id. at 231. However,
an offender's reasons for engaging in proscribed conduct are often relevant on
the procedural side of the criminal law.... Motives are most relevant when the
trial judge sets the defendant's sentence, and it is not uncommon for a defendant
to receive a minimum sentence because he was active with good motives, or a
rather high sentence because of his bad motives.
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based on hostility toward the underlying message expressed. 73 In general,
the government may punish people for what they do, but not for what they
say. For example, if a person does something sexist, such as refusing to
grant a merit raise because of sexism, then the government can punish that
particular act. In addition, proof that the individual has uttered sexist re-
marks may be useful to impeach or rebut his assertion that he is not the type
of person to utter such remarks, but the government cannot punish merely
the uttering of such remarks. 74 The underlying message may be abhorrent,
heinous, and full of hate, but the First Amendment forbids the state from
punishing opinions, even detestable ones. "The motives behind the state law
may have been to do good. But the same can be said about most laws mak-
ing opinions punishable as crimes. History indicates that urges to do good
have led to the burning of books and even the burning of 'witches.' ",75 We
must resist these urges to "do good" by making exceptions to the First
Amendment.
73. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545; see also Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). In
Dawson the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the introduction, in a capital
sentencing proceeding, of the fact that the defendant was a member of an organization called
the Aryan Brotherhood, because the evidence had no relevance to the issues being decided. Id.
at 1097. The evidence showed "nothing more" than the defendant's abstract beliefs, where
those beliefs had no bearing on the issue being tried. For example, the victim, like the defend-
ant, was white, so no element of racial hatred was involved in the murder. There was also no
showing that the racist organization committed any unlawful or violent acts or even endorsed
those acts. The Court, however, explained that the state might have avoided this problem if it
had presented more evidence. Id. at 1098. The prosecution claimed that its expert witness
(who did not testify) would have demonstrated "that the Aryan Brotherhood is a white racist
prison gang that is associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and that
advocates the murder of fellow inmates." Id. at 1097. Such specific evidence might have been
relevant in rebutting the defendant's mitigating evidence, which consisted of testimony empha-
sizing his kindness to family members and the good time credits that he had earned by enroll-
ing in various drug and alcohol programs in prison. The racial hatred evidence would be
relevant in rebutting the question that the defendant chose to put in issue. Dawson did not
hold that the defendant could be punished for holding bigoted views.
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion argued that the prison gang membership was relevant
and admissible because it indicated that the defendant had the character of a person who
engages in prison gang activities. Id. at 1101. This evidence tended to establish future danger-
ousness and rebutted the defendant's effort to show that he was kind to others. Id. The major-
ity replied that the material that the dissent advanced on the nature of prison gangs "would, if
it had been presented to the jury, have made this a different case." Id. at 1099. But Delaware
only presented evidence of Dawson's "mere abstract beliefs ...." Id. at 1098. The majority
explained that the jurors should not be able to punish Dawson merely because they find his
beliefs to be morally reprehensible. Id.
While Dawson teaches us that the sentencing court cannot take into account the defendant's
abstract beliefs, if the beliefs are not abstract but relate to the crime, then the situation is
different. Thus, Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion), allowed the sen-
tencing judge, in deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death, to take into account the
defendant's racial animus towards his victim. Accord Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,
2202 (1993) (upholding a state law that allows penalty enhancement when the defendant
selects his victim - in this case, an assault and battery victim - on the basis of the victim's
race, religion, or other protected status).
74. See discussion supra note 69.
75. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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